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ESTOPPEL AND TEXTUALISM Gregory E. Maggs* 
I. Introduction Courts regularly conclude that parties in lawsuits are ‘estopped’ - thatis, involuntarily barred - from asserting claims and defenses, from seekingremedies, from presenting testimony or other evidence, or from makingcertain kinds of arguments.1  The reasons for judicially imposed estoppelvary but most often the estoppel serves to prevent one party from taking aposition that will cause an unjust harm to another.2  For example, a courtmight decide that a person who makes a statement on which someone elsehas relied is estopped from later taking a legal position that contradicts thestatement.3 Textualism is an influential school of statutory interpretation.  Its tenetsrestrict what courts may consider when construing legislation.  Under thetheory of textualism, judges are to determine the objective meaning of an
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4 See id. at 1462, 1516; Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 Va. L. Rev. 347(2005); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L.Rev. 1 (2001). 5 See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law35-36 (1997). 6 See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 894 illus. 1 (1979) (providing anexample in which a landowner who incorrectly describes a property boundary isestopped to maintain a trespass action against his neighbor who relied on theerroneous description). 7 A computer search for “date(>1/1/1990) and estoppel and ‘statute oflimitations”’ in WestLaw’s ALLCASES database yields more than 10,000 cases.
8 See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215 (McKinney 1999) (‘The following actions shallbe commenced within one year: ... an action to recover damages for assault, battery,false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, libel, slander, fa lse words causingspecial damages, or a violation of the right of privacy under section fifty-one of thecivil rights law ....’). 
enactment from its text and its legislative context.4  They should not allowlegislative history and policy arguments to influence their interpretationsor take it upon themselves to find exceptions, glosses, or creative interpre-tations of the plain meaning of statutes.5 In many lawsuits,  estoppel and textualism have nothing to do with eachother.  For example, courts often apply principles of estoppel*168 incommon law cases, where they have no occasion to interpret any legisla-tion. 6 Likewise, in deciding statutory cases, judges often have no reason toapply principles of estoppel because neither party has caused the kind ofharm that estoppel addresses. For instance, if the defendant has not madeany statements or taken any position on which the plaintiff has relied, thenthe plaintiff generally has no grounds for seeking to estop the defendantfrom raising a defense. But estoppel and textualism do sometimes appear to collide.  Judgesoften hold that parties are estopped from asserting rights that they haveunder a statute, even though the statute contains no express estoppelexception.  The typical statute of limitations provides the simplest andperhaps most common example. 7 The statute may say that a plaintiff mustbring a particular kind of legal action, such as an intentional tort claim,within one year.8  Ordinarily, one year means one year, and most statutesof limitation contain no express exceptions. But almost all courts -including those that ordinarily follow textualist precepts - stand ready to
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9 See infra part II.A. for  more detail on this point. 
extend the period, based on principles of estoppel, if the defendant has donesomething unjust, like concealing evidence of the claim.9 So the question arises: How might judges who purport to adhere totextualism justify their use of estoppel to affect the application of statutesthat say nothing about estoppel?  Are they creating policy based exceptionsto legislation?  Or is the proper characterization of what they are doingmore complicated than that? This essay seeks to answer these questions.  It considers six possiblearguments that courts have made or might make to rationalize the recogni-tion of unwritten exceptions to statutes in the name of estoppel.  Thesearguments include the following: * Even though the statutory provision at issue says nothing aboutestoppel, some other legislation expressly authorizes courts to invokeequitable principles, including estoppel; * The legislation contains an implied term authorizing the applicationof estoppel principles; * Courts have inherent equitable powers that allow them to applyprinciples of estoppel; *169 * The legislature that enacted the statute reasonably expected thatcourts would interpret it in accordance with accepted canons and back-ground principles, including estoppel; * Estoppel creates a cause of action or other legal right that the statute,by its terms, does not address; and * Binding precedent compels the application of estoppel principles, evenif they conflict with the text of the statute. Each of the six arguments, as discussed in part III below, has somevalidity.  Any one of them might justify uses of estoppel in at least someinstances.  But as this essay will show, none of the arguments provides ageneral basis upon which a textualist judge can use estoppel to affect theapplication of statutes that do not address estoppel.  The essay thereforeconcludes that some unresolved tension exists between traditional estoppelprinciples and textualism. Before addressing this subject further, I should make two preliminaryremarks.  First, this essay does not advocate that judges should or should
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10 See, e .g., Scalia, supra  note 5; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic StatutoryInterpretation (1994); Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes(1982); John Manning, Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism, 66 U.Chi. L. Rev. 685 (1999); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court’s NewHypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administra-tive State, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 749 (1995); Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability ofPractical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 533(1992); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in theCourtroom, 50  U. Chi. L. Rev. 800 (1983). 11 This conference is scheduled for July 16-22, 2006, at Utrecht in theNetherlands. 12 The questionnaire, posed to reporters from many different countries, includesinquiries such as: ‘How important is the concept of legitimate expectations orestoppel in your legal system? What is the part played by such a concept in contractlaw? In what respect can legitimate expectations or estoppel be used in order tointerpret some terms of the contract?’ 13 See B lack’s Law Dictionary, supra  note 3 , at 142 . 
not follow the textualist school of statutory interpretation.  Many otherworks address the question of how courts should interpret statutes.10  Noris the goal of the article to persuade judges to stop invoking principles ofestoppel. This essay instead seeks only to take an academic look at thequestion of how judges who have already adopted a textualist jurisprudencemight reconcile estoppel and their textualist views. In other words, it looksfor an explanation, but does not make a prescription. Second, this essay grew out of my assignment as the United Statesnational reporter for the topic of ‘Protecting Legitimate Expectations andEstoppel’ at the XVIIth Congress of the International Academy ofComparative Law.11  In this capacity, I prepared answers to a standard setof questions posed by Professor Bénédicte Fauvarque Cosson, the generalrapporteur for the subject.12  This essay addresses selected aspects ofProfessor Cosson’s questions. My complete answers are filed separatelywith the Conference. *170 II. Textualism and Estoppel A. Estoppel Black’s Law Dictionary concisely defines estoppel as a ‘bar thatprevents one from asserting a claim or right that contradicts what one hassaid or done before or what has been legally established as true.’13  Thedictionary also separately defines dozens of different kinds of estoppel that
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14 See, e .g., id. at 52 , 142, 590 (defining adoption by estoppel, authority byestoppel, assignor estoppel, and many more types of estoppel). 15 See W estinghouse Co. v. Formica Co., 266 U.S. 342, 349 (1924). 16 See Cruz-Lovo v. Ryder System, Inc., 2003 W L 23150113, *3 (11th Cir.2003) (‘The doctrine of estoppel by election provides that, when a party adopts acertain position that affects the relationship between that party and the adverseparty, i.e., a position pertaining to a contractual agreement between the parties, theparty is equitably estopped from impeaching its position to the detriment of theadverse party.’). 17 See E ldridge v. Burns, 142 Cal. Rptr. 845 , 870 (Cal. App. 1978). 18 See, e .g., Herrera v. Gibbs, 499 S.W .2d 912, 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). 
the courts of law and equity traditionally have recognized.14  A fewexamples convey the general idea: The doctrine of ‘assignor estoppel,’ for example, bars a person who hasassigned a patent from later attacking the patent’s validity.15  This ruleserves an easily understood purpose. Suppose an inventor obtains a patentto an invention and then sells the patent to someone else. The inventorshould not later have the ability to compete with the buyer of the patent inmaking the invention by claiming that the patent lacks validity. By sellingthe patent, the inventor in effect represented the validity of the patent andshould have to live with that representation rather than cause the buyer tosuffer a forfeiture. ‘Estoppel by election’ is a doctrine which says that a person who makesa choice among possible benefits cannot later claim benefits that a differentchoice would have afforded.16  For example, if a plaintiff sues a defendantfor breach of contract and seeks specific performance, a court mightconclude that the plaintiff is thereby estopped to seek rescission of thecontract.17  Simple justice precludes taking inconsistent positions that letyou have your cake and eat it too. And ‘authority by estoppel’ is a doctrine that says that one person (theprincipal) may not deny that another person (the agent) has authority to actfor him or her after giving a third party reason to believe such authorityexists. For example, if a business owner sends a salesperson to make acontract with a client, the business owner cannot later back out of thecontract by claiming that the salesperson lacked authority. Allowing thebusiness owner to change positions on the issue of authority would worka hardship on the customer.18 *171 Judges created these and other estoppel doctrines to preventsubstantive and procedural injustices. Each of the doctrines accords with
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19 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U .S. 653, 674 (U.S. 1969). 20 See John F. Manning, Texualism and Legislative Intent, 91 Va. L. Rev. 419,444-445 & n. 84 (2005); Farber, supra note 10, at 283-294. 21 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in StatutoryInterpretation, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub . Pol’y 61, 68 (1994). For general articles ontextualism, see Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103Harv. L. Rev. 405 (1989); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia’s Textualism: The‘New’ New Legal Process, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1597, 1639 (1991). 22 Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J.,concurring in the judgment). 
23 See Zeppos, supra note 21, at 1616. Typical examples include the ‘expressiounius’ canon, see N ational R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass’n of R.R.Passengers, 414  U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (by expressing one thing, a statute excludesother thing), and the ejusdem generis maxim, see Breininger v. Sheet MetalWorkers Int’l Ass’n, 493 U.S. 67, 91-92  & n.15 (1989) (context may narrow themeaning of a term). 
the general tendency of courts of equity to frown on inconsistency,self-serving conduct, and the passing of burdens from the persons whocreated them to those who did not. And these and other examples ofestoppel have become firmly established in the legal order; no one seriouslycontemplates doing away with what the Supreme Court has called the‘venerable doctrine of estoppel.’19 B. Textualism Textualism rests on two related principles.  The first is legislativesupremacy.  The idea is that once legislatures have enacted constitutionallegislation, the judicial and executive branches must follow it.20 They donot have the choice of reconsidering the legislation’s policy or modifyingthe legislation to meet perceived needs. Otherwise, we would not fully havea government of laws. The second principle concerns how legislatures work.  It says thatlegislatures speak authoritatively only through enacted legislation.21  Inaccordance with this principle, textualists consider the wording of a statutethe primary basis for determining the statute’s meaning. They read thestatute to find ‘the meaning most in accord with context and ordinaryusage. ‘22  In difficult cases, textualists may employ canons of constructionto help parse the statutory terms.23  They also may consult dictionaries andother sources that provide evidence of the standard meanings and usages of
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24 See M errill, supra note 9, at 356-357; Bradley C. Karkkainen, ‘PlainMeaning’: Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 Harv.J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 401, 407 (1994). 25 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, ‘Plain Meaning’: Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudenceof Strict Statutory Construction, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 401, 407-08 (1994). 26 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 5; Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 114 S. Ct.771, 782 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in thejudgment); United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 345 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurringin part) . 27 See G regory E. M aggs, The Secret Decline o f Legislative History: HasSomeone Heard a Voice Crying in the Wilderness?, 1994 Pub. Int. L. Rev. 57, 58.
words.24  And they may look at other parts of the legislation for contextualclues.25 But textualists generally eschew consideration of other extrinsic sourceswhen attempting to discern the meaning of legislation.  They *172 do nottry to divine the subjective intent of Congress by looking at committeereports, floor statements, or other forms of legislative history. They also donot allow policy considerations to influence their reading of statutes. Taken together, these two principles generally require judges to followlegislation and forbid them from treating anything other than legislation aslaw.  Accordingly, judges cannot create exceptions or glosses or anythingelse that would contradict what the statute says.  If a party has rights underan enactment, he or she can assert them. Textualism has many adherents.  For many years, its leading judicialadvocate has been Justice Antonin Scalia.  In his judicial opinions andextra-judicial writing, he has consistently advocated textualist approachesto statutory interpretation.26  And although the Supreme Court issues somenon-textualist decisions, Justice Scalia has influenced many of the membersof the Court. This influence in turn has encouraged the spread of textualismin lower courts.27 C. The Tension Although few courts have recognized it explicitly, a tension  existsbetween the standard application of principles of estoppel and the textualistschool of statutory interpretation.  The tension is that sometimes principlesof estoppel appear to lead courts to ignore the objective meaning ofstatutes.  Although a statute may give a party in a lawsuit a claim ordefense, the court may rule that the party is for one reason or anotherestopped to present the claim or defense, even though the statute says
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28 See, e.g., In re International Administrative Services, Inc., 408 F.3d 689, 699(11th Cir. 2005) (concluding that the period of limitations in the Bankruptcy Codefor bringing avoidance actions is subject to tolling by equitable estoppel); Rauscherv. City of Linco ln, 691  N.W .2d 844, 851-852 (Neb. 2005) (city estopped fromasserting statute of limitations to  block claim for unpaid wages). 29 Sharp v. United Airlines, Inc., 236 F.3d 368 , 372 (7th Cir. 2001). 30 Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U .S. 392, 396-97 (1946). 31 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts ch. 5, stat. note (1981) (providing aninformative overview of statutes of fraud in the U nited States). 32 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1624(a) (1985) (‘The following contracts areinvalid, unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing andsubscribed by the party to be charged or by the party’s agent: (1) An agreement thatby its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof. ...’). 
nothing about estoppel.  In this way, principles of estoppel may create - orat least appear to create unwritten exceptions - to legislation. The typical statute of limitations, as discussed above, provides anillustrative example.  A statute of limitations says that a plaintiff has a setnumber of years in which to bring a lawsuit.  Most statutes of limitationscontain no express exceptions relating to the conduct of the defendant.  Butcourts nonetheless sometimes do not permit a defendant to assert theexpiration of a period of limitations as a defense, citing the judge-madedoctrine of ‘equitable estoppel.’28 *173 In the context of the statute of limitations, equitable estoppelallows a plaintiff to assert a claim against the defendant, even if the statuteof limitations has expired, when the ‘defendant takes active steps to preventthe plaintiff from suing on time.’29  These active steps may includefraudulently concealing the injury that the defendant has caused or assuringthe plaintiff that the statute of limitations will not be asserted as a defense.30 A typical statute of frauds provides another example.  A statute offrauds usually says that a court may not enforce a contract unless it isevidenced by a writing signed by the party against whom enforcement issought. 31 For instance, many states have statutes of frauds saying that apromise that cannot possibly be completed within one year is not enforce-able unless evidenced by a signed writing.32  Such a statute would, forexample, prevent a plaintiff from enforcing an oral promise by thedefendant to maintain a building for five years unless the defendant at somepoint signed a written document revealing in some way that he or she hadmade the promise. 
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33 See Monarco v. Lo Greco, 220 P.2d 737, 740 (Cal. 1950) (describing howequitable ‘estoppel to plead the statute of frauds can ... arise when there have beenrepresentations with respect to the requirements of the statute indicating that awriting is not necessary or will be executed or that the statute will not be relied uponas a defense’). 34 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139(1) (1981) (‘A promise whichthe promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the partof the promisee or a third person and which does induce the action or forbearanceis enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided onlyby enforcement of the promise.’). See also Gregory E. Maggs, Ipse Dixit: TheRestatement (Second) of Contracts and the Modern Development of Contract Law,66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 508, 523-525 (1998) (analyzing the reception of § 139 inthe United States). 
But many courts have used principles of estoppel to overcome statutesof frauds and enable them to enforce oral promises.  Under the doctrine ofequitable estoppel, for instance, courts might prevent the defendant fromdenying the existence of a signed writing if the defendant told the plaintiffthat a signed writing exists (‘I have signed the offer that you sent me’) orif the defendant told the plaintiff that no writing was required or that he orshe would not rely on the statute of frauds.33  And under the doctrine ofpromissory estoppel, some courts would enforce the promise, notwithstand-ing the lack of a signed writing, if the plaintiff had relied on the promise.34In these examples, principles of estoppel serve in effect to createunwritten exceptions to legislation.  In applying these principles, a *174court denies the defendant the right to assert the statute of limitations or thestatute of frauds as a defense, even though the text of the statute appears togive the defendant that right. These judicially created estoppel doctrines,in other words, seem to trump the legislation. This phenomenon seems inconsistent with textualism.  If a legislaturehas enacted a statute of frauds, a statute of limitations, or any other statute,shouldn’t the enactment prevail over unwritten judicial doctrines likeestoppel?  Isn’t the text of the statute controlling under the doctrine oflegislative supremacy?  Shouldn’t the legislature have responsibility fordetermining what exceptions should and should not exist? Despite the existence of this tension, the use of estoppel for suchpurposes is common, long-standing, and accepted, even among otherwisetextualist courts.  And yet no court to date has offered a comprehensiveexplanatory theory for the practice.  So the question arises whether closeranalysis might reveal any possible rationalizations for using estoppel toovercome the language of statutes. 
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35 The pre-2003 verison of this model statute says: ‘Except as otherwiseprovided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 ormore is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some writingsufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties andsigned by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agentor broker.’ U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (2002). This version of the statute is in effect in 49states and numerous territories. The American Law Institute and the NationalConference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law approved an amendment tothis provision in 2003 that would raise the dollar threshold from $500 to $5000, seeU.C.C. § 2-201(1) (2004), but no state has yet adopted that change. This essaytherefore will refer  to the pre-2003 version. 36 See U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (2002) (creating an exception for transactions betweenmerchants where the merchant to be charged does not respond to a memorandumconfirming an oral contract); id. § 2-201(3) (creating exceptions for speciallymanufactured goods, formal admissions that a contract has been made, andtransactions in which the goods or payment has been received). 
III. Possible Textualist Rationalizations As the foregoing part of this article has shown, courts have relied onprinciples of estoppel to reach results apparently contrary to the plainlanguage of statutes.  For example, they have enforced contracts that thetext of a statute of frauds says they should not enforce and they haveentertained claims that the language of a statute of limitations would bar.The following discussion considers eight possible rationalizations toexplain how this practice might be consistent with textualist principles. A. Authorized by Other Legislation Even if a particular statute does not contain any express estoppelexceptions, a textualist judge in some instances might still find theexceptions to exist on grounds that some other legislation creates them.  Inother words, one statutory provision might authorize courts to useprinciples of estoppel when applying a separate statutory provision.  In sucha case, a textualist judge would be following rather ignoring legislativecommands when invoking estoppel principles. Consider, for example, § 2-201 of the Uniform Commercial Code,which establishes a statute of frauds for contracts for the sale of goods.35This section says that no contract for the sale of goods for a *175 price of$500 or more may be enforced absent a signed writing evidencing that thecontract was made. Section 2-201 contains various express exceptions, butnone of these exceptions concerns estoppel.36  Accordingly, if a textualistjudge were to look just at the language of § 2-201, he or she might concludethat estoppel cannot bar a defendant from asserting the statute of frauds. 
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37 Id. § 1-103(b) (emphasis added). 38 U.C.C. § 1-103(b). 39 See, e.g., Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 635 P.2d 103, 107(Wash. 1981). See also Warder & Lee Elevator, Inc. v. Britten, 274 N.W.2d 339,345  (Iowa 1979) (Reynoldson, C.J., dissenting). 
But that analysis would not be complete.  The Uniform CommercialCode contains another important statutory provision, § 1-103(b) (formerly§ 1-301), which contains the following statement: (b) Unless displaced by the particular provisions of [the UniformCommercial Code], the principles of law and equity, including thelaw merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principaland agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion,mistake, bankruptcy, and other validating or invalidating causesupplement its provisions.37Pursuant to this provision, some courts have concluded that the UniformCommercial Code authorizes and indeed requires them to considerprinciples of estoppel when applying the statute of frauds in § 2-201, eventhough § 2-201 itself does not say anything about them. When legislation specifically directs courts to make reference toprinciples of estoppel, textualism stands as no bar to the use of theseprinciples.  On the contrary, textualism requires it.  But this possibility onlyrarely explains why textualist courts may supplement statutes with estoppelprinciples for two reasons. First, very few enactments contain provisions that specifically authorizecourts to resort to estoppel principles.  Section 1-103(b) applies to theUniform Commercial Code, but it does not apply to statutes of fraud,statutes of limitations, and other enactments outside of the UniformCommercial Code.  Consequently, this first basis upon which textualistjudges might rationalize their use of estoppel principles to affect theapplication of statutes has a very limited application. Second, even though provisions like § 1-103(b) exist, their applicationis not always clear. The text of the section says that principles of estoppelapply ‘[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions’ of *176 the UniformCommercial Code.38  Some courts have concluded that § 2-201, the statuteof frauds, in fact does displace estoppel because it lists several specificexceptions and does not list estoppel.39  These courts have concluded thatthe legislatures that enacted § 2-201 did not want courts to use principlesof estoppel. 
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40 533  U.S. 678 (2001). 41 See 8  U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (1994 ed., Supp. V) (‘An alien ordered removedwho is inadmissible under section 1182  of this title, removable under section1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of this title or who has been determinedby the Attorney G eneral to be a  risk to the community or unlikely to comply withthe order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal period and, if released,shall be subject to the terms of supervision in paragraph (3).’). 42 533  U.S. at 699-700. 43 Id. at 706-07 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
B. Implied Estoppel Terms How else might a textualist judge conclude that principles of estoppelaffect the application of a statute that says nothing expressly aboutestoppel?  In some instances, the judge might decide that the statute at issuecontains an implied term concerning estoppel.  For example, the courtmight interpret a statute of frauds or statute of limitations to have animplicit estoppel exception that the legislature intended, but did not stateexpressly. The principles of textualism do not categorically preclude the findingof implied terms in legislation.  But under textualist theory, the conclusionthat an act contains an implied term must rest on the language, structure,and evident purpose of the statute.  The implied term cannot arise frompolicy considerations, legislative history, or other extrinsic evidence. Justice Scalia addressed the textualist approach to implied terms in hisdissent in Zadvydas v. Davis.40 In that case, the government detained analien named Zadvydas pursuant to a section of the federal Immigration andNaturalization Act allowing the Attorney General to detain an alien who isremovable from the country based on violations of criminal law.41  Thestatute contained no express limitation on the duration of the detention; onthe contrary, the statute appeared to permit the government to hold the alienuntil his or her removal to a foreign country, however long that might take.But when the United States could find no other country to which itcould remove Zadvydas, he challenged his continued detention.  Concernedthat a statute authorizing indefinite detention might violate Due Process, themajority of the Supreme Court construed the statue to contain a ‘reasonabletime’ limitation.42  Justice Scalia dissented,*177 addressing the questionfrom a textualist perspective.43  Although he appeared to agreed thatstatutes may contain implied terms, he found no basis for concluding thatthe Immigration and Naturalization Act contained an implied term that
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44 See id . 45 Id. at 708. 46 220  P.2d 737 (Cal. 1950). 47 See Cal. Civ. Code § 1624 (1950) (listing “an agreement ... to devise orbequeath any property, or to make any provision for any person by will” as one ofthe kinds of contracts that is invalid unless evidenced by a signed writing”). 48 220 P.2d a t 741 (asserting that ‘estoppel to assert the statute of frauds hasbeen consistently applied by the courts of this state to  prevent fraud  that wouldresult ... in the unconscionable injury that would  result from denying enforcementof the contract after one party has been induced by the other seriously to change hisposition in reliance on the contract ....’). 
would help Zadvydas.44  He saw nothing in the text, structure, or purposeof the Act that would support the majority’s view. Instead, he lamented thatthe Court ‘simply amends the statute to impose a time limit.’45 In actual practice, courts that have concluded that principles of estoppelaffect the application of statutes generally have not followed textualistprinciples concerning implied terms.  Consider, for example, the famousdecision of the California Supreme Court in Monarco v. Lo Greco. 46  Inthat case, a rancher orally promised his stepson that he would change hiswill to leave him the family ranch if the stepson worked on the propertyafter he turned 18. The stepson complied, laboring for many years on theranch. But after the rancher died, the stepson learned that he had not kepthis promise to change his will, and the property was to go to someone else.The stepson brought a lawsuit, which in effect sought to enforce therancher’s oral promise to change his will.  California at the time had astatute of frauds preventing the enforcement of promises to change a willunless evidenced by a signed writing.47  This statute, in the ordinary course,would have prevented the stepson from enforcing the rancher’s promise.But Chief Justice Roger Traynor concluded that the rancher’s estate wasestopped from asserting the statute of frauds because of the stepson’sreliance on the rancher’s promise. The decision did not rest on grounds that the statute of frauds containedan implied exception for reliance.  Chief Justice Traynor’s opinion did noteven address the text of the applicable statute of frauds.  Instead, theopinion simply concluded that refusing to enforce the rancher’s promisewould be unconscionable and that estoppel therefore should apply.48  If theCalifornia Supreme Court had considered the issue from a textualistperspective, it would have had to look at the statute carefully to decidewhether the language, structure,*178 or purpose of the act would justifyfinding the existence of an implied estoppel exception. 
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49 586  S.W .2d 40 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). 50 See id . at 41. 51 Gumbel v. P itkin, 124 U.S. 131, 145-146 (1888). 
52 535  U.S. 43 (2002). 
Courts that have taken a textualist approach with respect to impliedterms generally have not identified implied estoppel exceptions.  Forexample, in C.G. Campbell & Sons, Inc. v. Comdeq Corp.,49  the court hadto consider whether a plaintiff could use promissory estoppel to overcomethe statute of frauds in Uniform Commercial Code § 2-201. The courtobserved that § 2-201 already stated several exceptions to the statute offrauds, but did not have one related to reliance.50  So the court concludedthat the legislature did not desire additional exceptions, and refused to findan implied exception for reliance. C. Inherent Equitable Power of the Courts Textualist judges also might rationalize using principles of  estoppel toaffect the application of a statute on grounds that courts have ‘inherent’equitable powers. Inherent powers are powers that exist even though nolegislation specifically grants them. The Supreme Court long has main-tained that the federal courts have inherent equitable powers. As early as1888, the Court declared that ‘the equitable powers of the courts of theUnited States, sitting as courts of law, over their own process, to preventabuse, oppression, and injustice, are inherent, and as extensive and efficientas may be required by the necessity for their exercise.’51 But with these inherent equitable powers, may courts override the textof statutes?  The Supreme Court appeared to do that in United States v.Young,52  where it relied on inherent equitable powers to conclude that abankruptcy court could toll a limitation period under the Federal Bank-ruptcy Code. In that case, Mr. and Mrs. Young filed a bankruptcy petitionin 1997 and received a discharge. The IRS subsequently sought to collectfrom the Youngs a tax debt from 1993. The Youngs asserted that the taxdebt was discharged in their 1997 bankruptcy, but the IRS contended thatit was not discharged pursuant to an exception found in the BankruptcyCode. Under the exception, if the IRS has a claim for taxes ‘for which thereturn was due within three years before the bankruptcy petition was filed,’
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53 See 11 U.S.C. §  523 (‘(a) A d ischarge ... does not discharge an individualdebtor from any debt - (1) for a tax or a customs duty - . ..  (B) with respect to whicha return, if required - ... (ii) was filed after the date on which such return was lastdue, under applicable law or under any extension, and after two years before thedate of the filing of the petition ....’). 54 535  U.S. at 52. 55 503  U.S. 638 (1992). 
the claim is nondischargeable.53  Although the tax claim *179 at issue in thecase was in fact more than three years old in 1997 when the Youngsreceived their discharge, the IRS argued that the Youngs should beestopped to assert the three-year look-back period. The IRS pointed out thatthe Youngs had filed but withdrawn another bankruptcy petition, after 1993and before 1997, preventing the IRS from pursuing the tax debt earlier. Although the Youngs correctly argued that the Bankruptcy Codecontained no provision expressly providing for tolling, the Supreme Courtsided with the IRS.  Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia - theleading textualist jurist - concluded that equitable tolling extended thethree-year look-back period specified in the exception. Justice Scaliaexplained the decision by saying that it was reasonable to conclude thatCongress was ‘assuming that bankruptcy courts will use their inherentequitable powers to toll the federal limitations periods within the Code.’54Given that courts have these inherent equitable powers, Justice Scaliaapparently saw the text of the statute as no impediment to tolling thelimitation period. The Young decision may appear to provide a general rationalization forthe use of estoppel to affect the application of statutes that do not providefor estoppel.  But the case raises two questions.  The first concerns thescope of a court’s ‘inherent’ equitable powers. The opinion does not sayexactly when a court can find equitable tolling appropriate and when itcannot. It also does not make clear whether a court may use its inherentequitable powers to address only procedural and jurisdictional questions -like the application of the statute of limitations - or whether the courts alsocan employ them more generally to affect the substance of the law. Consider another bankruptcy decision from the Supreme Court, Taylorv. Freeland & Kronz,55  which took a very different approach. In that case,when a debtor named Davis declared bankruptcy, she filed a list of herproperty that she claimed to be exempt from distribution to creditors.Everyone subsequently agreed that Davis did not have a legal basis forclaiming some of the listed property as exempt. But § 522(l) of the
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56 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) (‘The debtor shall file a list of property that the debtorclaims as exempt under subsection (b) of this section. ... Unless a party in interestobjects, the property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt.’). 57 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(b) (‘A party in interest may file an objection to  the listof property claimed as exempt only within 30 days after the meeting of cred itorsheld under § 341(a) is concluded or within 30 days after any amendment to the listor supplemental schedules is filed, whichever is later.’). 58 503  U.S. at 643-644. 59 Id. at 648-649 (Stephens, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Hackett, 13 B.R. 755,756  (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981)). 
Bankruptcy Code said that property claimed as exempt is exempt, unlessthe bankruptcy trustee or a creditor objects.56  Federal Bankruptcy Rule4003(b) gave the bankruptcy trustee and creditors exactly 30 days forsubmitting objections. In the case, no one objected within this time.57 *180 Later, when the trustee realized that Davis did not have a basis forclaiming some of the property as exempt, he filed an untimely objection.The majority of the Supreme Court refused to allow the bankruptcy trusteeto make a late objection given the plain language of Rule 4003 and §522(l). The Court recognized that its decision allowed Davis to keepproperty that he otherwise could not keep from his creditors. But the Courtsaw no grounds for intervening. ‘Deadlines may lead to unwelcomeresults,’ the Court said, ‘but they prompt parties to act and they producefinality.’58 The dissent disagreed, expressing a view more like that of the Court inYoung.  The dissent would have allowed the bankruptcy court to disallowclaims based on equitable considerations even after the 30-day period if thedebtor did not have a good faith basis for asserting the exemption.  Quotinga bankruptcy court that had adopted this view, the dissent said: “’[e]quit-able considerations dictate that a debtor should not be allowed exemptionsto which she is obviously not entitled.”’59 Why the Court thought that the bankruptcy court could use its equitablepowers to toll the three-year look-back period in Young but could not usethose same powers to toll the 30-day objection period in Taylor remainsunclear.  Maybe a court’s inherent equitable powers have some sort ofrelevant limits, but the Court has not said what they are, or why they wouldlead to different results in the two cases.  At the very least, Taylor showsthat courts cannot always cite inherent equitable powers as a basis for usingestoppel to affect the application of a statute that does not address estoppel.
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Second, the Young decision leaves open the issue of whether legisla-tures might limit the inherent equitable power of courts.  For example,suppose that Congress had expressly said in § 522 that a court cannot tollthe three-year look-back period. Could a court nonetheless use its equitablepower to toll the period? Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Youngdoes not address this question precisely. But it does suggests that theanswer is no. Justice Scalia ruled that the Youngs were estopped on groundthat it was ‘reasonable’ to conclude that Congress had assumed courtswould have that power.60  If the statute had prohibited tolling, the Courtcould not have found it reasonable to conclude that Congress had wantedcourts to engage in equitable tolling. *181 D. Background Principles and Canons A textualist judge also might rationalize using principles of estoppel toaffect the application of statutes on grounds that no one statute re-createsthe entire legal universe.  The theory is that, when a legislature passes anew act, it assumes that the act will fit into the existing legal system.Congress, for example, does not specify in each new federal law thecircumstances in which the federal courts will have jurisdiction over thelaw; it already has enacted a general statute regarding jurisdiction overfederal acts.61  Similarly, the legislature may presume that courts willinterpret any new law that it enacts in accordance with existing canons ofconstruction. And likewise, the reasoning goes, a legislature may expectthat courts will apply traditional equitable principles in interpreting a newlaw, even if legislature does not say anything about them. Justice Scalia articulated this idea concisely in the Young bankruptcycase,62  discussed above, as an additional justification for concluding thatestoppel could toll the ‘look-back period’ for making tax debts non-dischargeable. He said: It is hornbook law that limitations periods are “customarily subject to‘equitable tolling,”’ . . ., unless tolling would be “inconsistent with the textof the relevant statute” . . . . Congress must be presumed to draft limitationsperiods in light of this background principle. . . . That is doubly true whenit is enacting limitations periods to be applied by bankruptcy courts, whichare courts of equity and “appl[y] the principles and rules of equity
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jurisprudence.”63 In this instance, as Justice Scalia explains, estoppel doesnot seem inconsistent with the principles of textualism.  But the idea thatCongress understands that courts will interpret new legislation subject toexisting canons can be more problematic for textualists.  Some of thecanons of construction that courts have identified, especially in the past,may conflict with the idea that the text of statutes binds the courts. Consider the famous case of Sorrells v. United States.64  In that case, thegovernment prosecuted Sorrells for violating federal liquor laws during theprohibition era. Sorrells wanted to raise a defense of entrapment, but thegovernment argued that the criminal statute at *182 issue did not makeentrapment a defense. The statute, in fact, was silent on the subject. The Supreme Court, though, sided with Sorrells, relying both onestoppel and on the idea that Congress enacts legislation subject to theexpectation that courts will interpret it in accordance with existing canonsof construction.  The Court cited a general canon saying that the criminallaws should be construed as narrowly as possible to accomplish theirobjective.  It then said: We are unable to conclude that it was the intention of the Congress inenacting this statute that its processes of detection and enforcement shouldbe abused by the instigation by government officials of an act on the partof persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission andto punish them.  We are not forced by the letter to do violence to the spiritand purpose of the statute.  This, we think, has been the underlying andcontrolling thought in the suggestions in judicial opinions that thegovernment in such a case is estopped to prosecute or that the courts shouldbar the prosecution.65 So because Congress had no need to punish peoplewhom the government lured into criminal wrongdoing, estoppel preventedthe government from prosecuting such people. Is Sorrells a textualist decision?  In a subsequent decision, Justice Scaliaseemed to think so, but expressed a caution.  Citing Sorrells and similardecisions, he said: It is one thing to acknowledge and accept such well defined (or evennewly enunciated), generally applicable, background principles of assumedlegislative intent.  It is quite another to espouse the broad proposition thatcriminal statutes do not have to be read as broadly as they are written, but
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are subject to case-by-case exceptions.66 In other words, according toJustice Scalia, judges may use canons and background principles of law tointerpret statutes, but only if the canons and background principles are notintrinsically inconsistent with textualism. It turns out that the Court has not applied the approach of Sorrellsconsistently.  On the contrary, the Court sometimes simply declares thatthere is no estoppel exception to a statute, regardless of whether estoppelis a general background principle.  In Reiter v. Cooper, for example, theCourt considered a federal statute requiring shippers to pay the tariff ratethat freight carriers had filed with the *183 Interstate Commerce Commis-sion. 67 In the case, a common carrier declared bankruptcy. The bankruptcytrustee then brought a lawsuit against a shipper who had paid the carrierless than the filed rate, seeking to collect the underpayment. The shipperargued that the trustee should be estopped to collect the underpayment. Butthe Court, citing precedent, simply held: ‘The filed rate doctrine embodiesthe principle that a shipper cannot avoid payment of the tariff rate byinvoking common-law claims and defenses such as ignorance, estoppel, orprior agreement to a different rate.’68  The Court offered no explanation forwhy estoppel might apply in a case like Sorrells but not in this case. Even if the Court did apply Sorrells consistently, the idea that courtsalways may use canons of construction raises three difficult questions.  Thefirst question is how to identify canons.  Consider, for instance, thequestion of whether a court may hold that a defendant is estopped fromasserting the statute of frauds as a defense when the plaintiff has relied onthe defendant’s promise.  Can a canon of construction exist on a longdisputed issue of this kind?  That seems a little unlikely.  As a result, atextualist judge would have to rationalize using estoppel to reach this resulton some other ground. The second question is how to distinguish between permissible andimpermissible canons, especially those concerning estoppel.  Justice Scaliasays that canons of construction cannot simply allow judges to createexceptions to statutory language on a case by case basis.  But the exactcontent of the restriction remains unclear, especially when cases likesSorrells and Reiter reach contrary conclusions on whether estoppel mayprevent the application of a statute. 
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69 287  U.S. at 448 . 70 133  N.W .2d 267 (1965). 71 See id . at 275 . 72 See id . 
73 Id. at 276. 
The third question is whether legislatures can abrogate canons ofconstruction and background principles.  For example, if a criminal statuteexpressly says that entrapment is not a defense, may a court read thedefense into the statute through principles of estoppel?  The Sorrellsopinion suggests that the answer is no.  The Court emphasized in thatdecision that it was not ‘doing violence to the statute’ by reading in thedefense based on principles of estoppel.69  But the issue remains howclearly Congress must speak if silence on the issue is not enough. E. Outside the Statute A textualist judge also might justify the application of estoppel byconcluding that estoppel creates a cause of action or other legal right thatthe statute, by its terms, does not address.  For example, suppose that astatute of limitations requires a particular kind of legal*184 claim to bebrought within three years and the statute contains no mention of excep-tions resting on estoppel. A textualist judge might worry about estoppinga defendant to rely on the statute of limitations as a defense to the claim.But if the court concludes that the plaintiff is actually bringing a differentclaim, and that the statute of limitations therefore does not apply, then thejudge may find the defendant estopped. This kind of reasoning appears in the famous contracts case of Hoffmanv. Red Owl Stores.70  In that case, a grocery store chain made vagueassurances to a prospective franchisee named Hoffman. When no franchiseagreement resulted, Hoffman sued the chain, claiming that he had relied onthe assurances in various ways. The chain argued that the assurances couldnot be enforced under contract law because they were too uncertain.71  Thecourt fully agreed with that proposition,72  but enforced the assurancesanyway. The Court explained, simply, ‘this is not a breach of contractaction’;73  instead, according to the court, Hoffman was bringing an actionbased on promissory estoppel. And the court said the same requirements ofdefiniteness did not apply. 
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74 The Wisconsin Supreme Court cited no statute requiring definiteness.Definiteness or certainty is typically a common law requirement. See Restatement(Second) of Contracts § 33(1) (1981) (‘Even though a manifestation of intention isintended to be understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form a contractunless the  terms of the contract are  reasonably certain.’). 75 835  So.2d 1091 (Fla. 2002). 76 Id. at 1097-98 (footnotes omitted). 
In Hoffman, as in most states, the requirement of definiteness apparentlywas specified by the common law rather than by a statute.74  Thus the casedoes not actually provide an example of using estoppel to overcomelegislation. But the point remains that the court justified using estoppel toovercome a defense that would have required a different result. If the statehad required definiteness in contracts by statute, a textualist judge couldhave used the same reasoning. But this possible rationalization for using estoppel to overcome theapplication of a defense has a significant limitation.  It only works when aplaintiff can invoke estoppel as a basis for a legal claim to which thedefense does not apply.  That possibility arises in the field of contracts, butnot many other areas of the law.  In most instances, estoppel bars a partyfrom taking a legal position, but does not create a cause of action. *185 F. Pre-Textualist Precedent Finally, a textualist judge might justify using estoppel to affect theapplication of a statute based on precedent.  Although the general idea oflegislative supremacy has been around for a long time, the case reportscontain countless non-textualist decisions.  Textualist judges may decideto follow these precedents on grounds of stare decisis, even though theymight disagree with their reasoning. Consider for example, the Florida Supreme Court’s recent decision inFlorida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. S.A.P.75  Inthat case, a former foster child sued a state agency, claiming that it hadnegligently overlooked child abuse. Although the period of limitations hadrun, the plaintiff sought to prevent the state agency from asserting thestatute based on equitable estoppel. The court ruled for the plaintiff, citingprevious decisions. The court said: ‘It is well settled in Florida and otherjurisdictions that the statutes of limitation can be deflected by the doctrineof equitable estoppel. This proposition is supported by vast precedent . . .. ‘76 
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Statements of this kind are typical because precedent supports the useof estoppel in most states.  But this case was made somewhat moreinteresting because the state attempted to distinguish the precedent that thecourt relied on.  Apparently, no prior case had specifically addressed theparticular statute of limitations that governed the case.77  And the stateargued that the precedent concerning other statutes was distinguishablebecause the statute at issue applied only to suits filed against the govern-ment. But the court ultimately rejected the argument, following theprecedent concerning other statutes.78This decision shows that textualist judges cannot always find easyrefuge in precedent when deciding whether estoppel should affect theapplication of a statute.  If the precedent is not directly on point, judgeshave a choice of how broadly to read it.  A commitment to principles oftextualism might lead some courts to construe the estoppel precedentnarrowly.  The Florida Supreme Court did not follow this course, but amore committed court might have done so.  Thus, precedent does notprovide a complete justification for applying principles of estoppel whenthey lead to results contrary to the language of legislation. *186 IV. Conclusion Textualist judges generally strive to follow the text of statutes.  They donot attempt to create exceptions to what the statute says based on policyarguments, remarks made by legislators, or other extrinsic evidence.  Andyet, they often apply principles of estoppel in ways that affect the applica-tion of statutes, even though the statutes say nothing about estoppel.  Howcan this be? This essay has offered six possible rationalizations for how to squareaccepted principles of estoppel with textualism.  Sometimes legislationoutside the statute being interpreted expressly authorizes courts to resort toprinciples of estoppel.  At other times courts may conclude that the statutecontains an implied term concerning estoppel.  Or courts may decide thatthey have inherent equitable powers that authorize them to rely on estoppel.Alternatively, courts might conclude that the legislature enacted the statutesubject to background principles, including estoppel.  More creatively,courts might determine that the estoppel operates outside the scope of thestatute.  And commonly, courts simply cite precedent. 
ESTOPPEL AND TEXTUALISM 23Several aspects of these rationalizations stand out.  First, the courts havemade express reference to each of them, but more often they simply applyprinciples of estoppel without considering the tension with textualism.Second, none of the rationalizations can reconcile all uses of estoppel withprinciples of textualism.  Indeed, some applications of estoppel appearunwarranted under textualist theory by any of the rationalizations.  Third,several of the rationalizations seem so open-ended that it is difficult toperceive what limits they have; they might authorize not only estoppel, butall kinds of exceptions to the statutory language.  For these reasons, theydo not provide a fully satisfactory explanation of how textualist judgesshould apply principles of estoppel. This essay has not sought to argue that a judge must or even shouldadhere to textualism in statutory cases.  That is a subject many others haveaddressed.  But if judges do choose to follow that course, doctrines ofestoppel continue to present a challenge.
